INTRODUCTION
The title of the present article makes a reference to the paper of Prinz (1992) , in which the impossibility to perceive brain activity is taken for granted and serves as a starting point for further investigations. In fact, a lot is known about conscious perception of various bodily processes. Particularly, a large literature exists about physiological, psychological, pharmacological, and methodological factors determining perception of changes in the gastrointestinal tract (e.g., Hölzl et al., 1996; Mollen et al., 1999) . Also the perception of one's own heart rate (Jones, 1994) and fluctuations of blood sugar (Cox et al., 1989; Gonder-Frederick et al., 1991) have been intensively investigated. For all these peripheral functions, specialized sense organs (e.g., baro-, thermo-, and chemoreceptors) exist which inform the brain about activity level changes. Accordingly, event-related brain potentials time-locked to heart beats (Schandry et al., 1986; Weitkunat & Schandry, 1990) or gut stimulation (Hollerbach et al., 1998; Johnston et al. 1999 ) have been used to study mechanisms of visceral perception. The issue of autonomic perception is thus less about what information is available than about to what extent this information can be open to conscious awareness (Vaitl, 1996) .
In contrast, no specialized receptive structures in the brain tissue are known for the perception of states and processes in the brain. In line with this important differ-ence between peripheral and central physiological processes, subjects who learned to control their autonomic responses were able to report much more consistent strategies they used for self-control (Roberts et al., 1984) than subjects who learned to control their electroencephalogram (EEG) (Roberts et al., 1989) . However, the method of direct verbal description of one's conscious strategies may be too coarse to grasp possibly fluent perception of brain activity. It may be suggested that learning to control the EEG did lead to corresponding percepts, but these percepts were difficult to verbalize. Moreover, the subjects in those experiments participated only in a few training sessions. Longer training might lead to a better perception.
For the past 20 years, large literature has been accumulated about the ability of humans to control low-frequency EEG components: the so called slow cortical potentials (SCPs) (Siegel et al., 1979; Bauer & Lauber, 1979; Elbert et al., 1980; Birbaumer et al., 1981; Rockstroh et al., 1984; Lutzenberger et al., 1993; Kotchoubey et al., 1996a; Bauer et al., 1998 ; to mention only most important studies). These SCPs are changes of brain potentials lasting for several hundred milliseconds to several seconds and reflecting depolarization shifts of apical dendrites in the superficial cortical layers (Birbaumer et al., 1990; Rockstroh et al., 1989) . The functional significance of the SCPs is thought to be the control of the excitability levels, with negative SCP shifts reflecting ''warming up'' cortical neurons and, thus, a decrease of their firing threshold (Elbert & Rockstroh, 1987; Birbaumer et al., 1990) . When patients with intractable epilepsy learn to control their SCPs in the course of several weeks, this leads to a significant decrease of seizure frequency (Kotchoubey et al., 1996b (Kotchoubey et al., , 1999a (Kotchoubey et al., , 2001 Rockstroh et al., 1993) . One may ask whether long-lasting learning may result in the ability of epilepsy patients to perceive the controlled process.
Both experiments described below were approved by the Ethical Committee of the University of Tübingen. In the first experiment, epilepsy patients learned to produce either positive or negative slow potential shifts. Three times during training they estimated how successful they performed their task on a particular trial. SCP amplitudes were averaged separately for the two tasks (i.e., negativity requirement versus positivity requirement), estimation (subjectively perceived success in performing the corresponding task), and time point of the measurement. The following predictions were made: (1) According to previous findings demonstrating the ability of epilepsy patients to fulfill the SCP control task requirements, we expected that the real SCP amplitude would differ between the two tasks. This ability may be acquainted with time and thus manifest itself only in later experimental sessions. In statistical terms, therefore, a main effect of Task and/or a Task ϫ Session interaction was expected. (2) If patients can learn not only to control their SCPs but also to estimate them correctly, the real SCP amplitude would be more negative on trials subjectively assessed as ''success'' in the negativity task, as well as on trials subjectively assessed as ''failure'' in the positivity task, than vice versa. This would result in a Task ϫ Estimation or a Task ϫ Estimation ϫ Session interaction.
Note that a main effect of Estimation would simply imply different SCP amplitudes on trials estimated as success versus failure regardless of the actual task requirement. This meaningless result was, therefore, not expected.
EXPERIMENT I Materials and Methods
Patients. Thirty patients with drug-resistant focal epilepsy participated in a course of SCP control training. Three patients refused to take part in the self-estimation procedure as they believed it interfered with SCP control. Since SCP control was expected (and actually found, see Kotchoubey et al., 2001) to reduce the patients' seizure rate, it was ethically questionable to enforce their participation in a procedure they felt might impede the therapeutic effect. In another five participants the selfestimation scores contained no variance; e.g., two of them always assessed their performance on positivity trials as ''very good'' since they ''knew from the previous trials that their performance of this task was good.'' This distorting effect of previous knowledge on the actual perception is known to be one of the great problems in studying perception of physiological functions (Pennebaker & Epstein, 1983; Pennebaker & Hoover, 1984) . For example, subjects experiencing anxiety often report heart rate acceleration just because they know this phenomenon should accompany anxiety.
The data of the remaining 22 patients (12 females; mean age 33.4 Ϯ 3.7, range 21-45) were analyzed. It should be emphasized that patients were not selected on the basis of their better SCP control. As is shown below, some of them were, in fact, ''poor controllers.'' Moreover, post hoc comparisons revealed no difference between the 8 ''drop-out'' patients and the remaining patients in terms of their personality (as measured by the MMPI), stress responses and coping strategies, and intelligence (WAIS) as well as in the rate of seizure reduction following treatment. Ten of 22 patients had a left temporal focus, and 8 had a right temporal focus. The other 4 patients were diagnosed as having multifocal epilepsy. None of the patients had psychogenic seizures, a major psychotic disorder, or a full-scale IQ Ͻ80. The medication regime was kept constant during the entire study.
Procedure. The training course consisted of two phases, with the first phase entailing 20 daily SCP self-control sessions and the second phase 15 sessions. The two phases were separated by an 8-week practice phase during which the patients were told to practice at home the strategies they had learned during the first training phase. Each session consisted of 140 randomly presented 8-s trials on which patients were required to generate an SCP shift either in the positive or negative direction, indicated by a letter A or B, respectively. This letter appeared on a computer screen at the onset of a trial and remained until its end. In the feedback condition (70-90 trials per session) a moving cursor was presented on the screen simultaneously with the letter; its position corresponded to the actual SCP amplitude averaged over 500-ms intervals slid with 100-ms steps. The patient's task was to move the cursor rightward, which manifested a negative SCP shift with the letter A and a positive SCP shift with the letter B. Conversely, leftward cursor movements always indicated a shift in the direction opposite to the task requirement. In the remaining 50-70 trials per session (referred to as the transfer condition) no feedback of the SCP amplitude was delivered, but only the letter A or B. Transfer trials were presented as two equal blocks in the middle of the session. As SCP control improved, the number of feedback trials decreased and the number of transfer trials increased. More details on the training procedure can be found in Kotchoubey et al. (1999a Kotchoubey et al. ( , 2001 ).
The SCPs were recorded (low-pass filter: 30 Hz; time constant: 10 s) at the vertex against two mastoid electrodes linked over a 10-kΩ shunt. SCP amplitude that was presented to patients as the moving cursor in the feedback condition was corrected on-line to exclude eye movement artifacts (the correction algorithm; see Kotchoubey et al., 1996b) . For the off-line data analysis, a conventional artifact correction algorithm (Gratton et al., 1983) was used. Mean SCP amplitude during the last 6 s of an 8-s trial was measured.
A self-perception procedure was introduced in the transfer condition in the 2nd, 15th, and 30th sessions. Patients observed a big poster with a 7-item scale, with 7 meaning a very successful SCP control in a trial [''the (invisible) cursor would have been on the right edge of the screen''] and 1 standing for an unsuccessful trial [''the (invisible) cursor would have been on the left edge of the screen'']. Patients were asked to spell out a number between 1 and 7 after the end of each trial according to their perceived estimation of that trial. They were explicitly instructed to respond as soon as possible and to not attempt to give a very accurate estimate.
Analysis of subjective ratings. Most patients did not use the entire rating scale of 1 to 7, but rather either the right end of the scale or its left end according to their mood state. The latter option was used more often because epilepsy patients are known to frequently display moderate depressive symptoms which result in their consistent underestimation of their own performance (e.g., Blumer, 1991; Roth et al., 1994) . Patients reported that in each task they distinguished between three groups of trials which they could designate as ''successful,'' ''unsuccessful,'' and ''don't know'' so that a 3-point scale would be more appropriate. Accordingly, the scores of each individual patient were subdivided into three classes (low, average, and high scores) so that all classes contained an equal number of trials.
Statistical analysis. Two methods of statistical inference were used. First, SCP data were used in a repeated-measures analysis of variance in which Estimation was included as a factor having two levels (high versus low estimation scores, i.e., trials estimated as good versus poor). Other factors were Task (positivity versus negativity) and Session (2/15/30). Before entering the ANOVA, the SCP data for each patient per session, task, and estimation were z-transformed according to the formula z ϭ M/σ, where M was the mean SCP amplitude (in microvolts) in the corresponding condition and σ was the standard deviation across trials.
The ANOVA provided the most direct test for the hypotheses formulated at the end of the Introduction. On the other hand, the trials estimated with average scores (''don't know'' responses) were excluded from the analysis. A correlational analysis across all trials would avoid this disadvantage. However, it was impossible to compute a correlation over all patients, since the same score had different meaning for different patients (the score 4, for instance, meant ''very good'' for one who used only 1 to 4, but ''very bad'' for one who used 4 to 7). Thus product-movement correlations between the subjective rating and the SCP amplitude were computed for each individual per session (a total of 66 correlations). SCP amplitudes recorded with the negativity task were multiplied by Ϫ1 before computation. These correlations were then normalized using Fisher's logarithm transformation and averaged.
SCP control. First, we needed measures of the patients' performance (i.e., their SCP control) independently of their estimation. Thus z values (z ϭ M/σ) were computed across all estimation scores (one z per session and task). Further, we asked if this performance differed between the conditions with and without the self-estimation procedure. For this sake z values were also computed across transfer trials during sessions 1, 14, and 29, which immediately preceded self-estimation sessions but did not entail the self-estimation procedure.
Finally, to obtain an overall level of SCP control, an ''individual Z'' was calculated for each patient as Z ϭ (M N Ϫ M P )/σ S , where M N and M P were mean SCP amplitudes in microvolts averaged across all sessions of the second training phase for the negativity task and the positivity task, respectively, and σ S was the standard deviation across sessions. Patients with ''individual Z'' Ն 2.0 (n ϭ 8) were qualified as good performers, those with 2.0 Ͼ Z Ͼ 1.5 (n ϭ 7) as average performers, and patients with Z Յ 1.5 (n ϭ 7) were regarded as poor performers.
Results
The ANOVA revealed a significant Task ϫ Estimation interaction [F(1, 21) ϭ 5.04, p Ͻ .05] indicating that, by and large, the patients could correctly estimate whether they were able to perform their task. A more detailed analysis revealed that in the 2nd and 15th sessions the perceived SCP shifts did not reliably correspond to real SCP amplitudes. Only in the 30th session was this correspondence highly significant [F(1, 21) ϭ 12.05, p Ͻ .002], leading to a significant Session ϫ Task ϫ Estimation interaction: F(2, 42) ϭ 4.07, p Ͻ .05. (All effects including the factor Session are reported with Greenhouse-Geisser correction for nonsphericity.)
The level of SCP control during self-perception was only average, as indicated by a nonsignificant main effect of Task and a marginally significant Task ϫ Session interaction [F(2, 42) ϭ 3.11, p ϭ .08]. This was in strong contrast to the previously published results (see Introduction) and to the data obtained in the present study in sessions without self-estimation, where a highly significant Task effect [F(1, 21) ϭ 15.26, p Ͻ .0001] suggested that patients very effectively differentiated between the two task requirements even without feedback. Figure 1 represents the results of selfestimation in the 2nd, 15th, and 30th session together with the data on SCP selfcontrol in the immediately preceding 1st, 14th, and 29th sessions. It can be seen that already in the 14th session the patients' control of their SCP shifts was significant, although the significant estimation of these shifts was attained only in the 30th session.
Further, the between-subject factor Group (good/average/bad performers) was added to the ANOVA. The patient who were superior in the SCP self-control perceived their SCP shifts with higher accuracy, as suggested by a significant Group ϫ Task ϫ Estimation interaction: F(2, 19) ϭ 3.65, p Ͻ .05 (see Fig. 2 ).
The correlational analysis revealed that 52 of 66 correlation coefficients between the SCP amplitude and its estimation were positive, although only 11 were significant (p Ͻ .05). On average, the positive relationship between the subjective and objective measures of the SCP was confirmed: F(1, 21) ϭ 12.32, p Ͻ .005. The increase of the mean correlation coefficient across sessions (.12 in the 2nd session versus .15 in the 30th session) was not significant (p ϭ .38).
To explore the specificity of the brain states the patients presumably perceived, other measures of brain activity apart from the SCPs should be taken into consider- ation. As is shown in Fig. 2 , each trial began with a visual evoked potential elicited by the presentation of the letter A or B. The amplitudes and latencies of the peaks N1 (70-160 ms poststimulus), P2 (200-280 ms), and N2 (250-350 ms) were measured and analyzed like the SCP amplitude (Kotchoubey et al., 1997) . These variables did not vary as a function of estimation. Likewise, a Fourier analysis of the EEG was conducted in the 30th session over trials estimated as good versus poor. This analysis also revealed no difference whatsoever in the EEG power spectra between the two kinds of trials in any performance group (Fig. 3) .
Discussion
Whereas the ability of epilepsy patients to control their SCP changes was already known (Kotchoubey, 1996b (Kotchoubey, , 2001 Rockstroh et al., 1993) , the ability to correctly estimate these changes has not been found before. It should not be surprising that this acquired ability was not uniform, but varied among patients; data on visceral perception also demonstrate very large individual differences in this ability (Penne- In the second session there was no task-related SCP differentiation. In the 30th session a small differentiation in the correct direction can be seen in trials estimated as good. In contrast, an opposite sign of the SCP difference was obtained on trials estimated as poor, i.e., the negativity was larger when positivity was required. (Bottom) Patients who exerted the most reliable SCP control. A slight difference in the correct direction during the 2nd session did not differ between the ''good'' versus ''bad'' trials. In the 30th session the mean task-related differentiation was as large as 10 µV, but only on the trials estimated as good.
baker & Hoover, 1984; Rouse et al., 1988; Weisz et al., 1988) . The fact that the overall performance in trials with the self-perception procedure was lower than in similar trials without this procedure indicates that during self-estimation, patients were confronted with a dual-task requirement. They were forced to divide their attention between the actual self-control and the estimation of how successful this control was.
FIG. 3.
EEG power spectra during estimation of the SCP amplitude in the 30th session in good and poor performers. Neither with the positivity task (top) nor with the negativity task (bottom) was there any significant difference between trials subjectively estimated as good (dashed line) versus poor (solid line).
In order to further explore the phenomenon of brain self-perception, new evaluation techniques should be developed which allow more automatic responses and reduce the interference between the two tasks. For instance, a better result might be achieved if a nonverbal measurement technique were used, e.g., if subjects were moving a rheostat slide instead of pronouncing numbers.
Although the results of the ANOVA and the correlational analysis do not agree in all details (thus the progress with sessions found by the ANOVA was not significant in correlation data), the complete agreement could hardly be expected given great methodological differences between the two methods. So the ANOVA operated with SCP amplitudes averaged across conditions and regarded estimation score as a qualitative variable having two values (good versus poor). In contrast, the correlational analysis operated with noisy single-trial SCP data and regarded estimation score as a continuous variable, whereas the range of its variability was rather restricted, which could have affected the size of the correlations. Notwithstanding these and other differences, both methods showed the patients' ability to estimate their SCP control above the chance level. Although the Task ϫ Estimation interaction was significant in the 30th session only, the Task ϫ Estimation ϫ Session interaction was significant over all sessions. Thus even though learning to perceive can take a long time, it is statistically improbable that the result of the 30th session was achieved by chance.
However, another argument against the idea of brain self-perception cannot be rejected on the basis of the first experiment. The successful SCP estimation might be mediated by peripheral reception. A negative SCP might mobilize muscle groups connected to the motor areas located near the vertex electrode. This muscular activity might cause proprioceptive feedback which allows patients to discriminate between the two cortical states. In order to check the plausibility of this interpretation, the second experiment was conducted with an almost completely paralyzed patient whose potential muscular activity was minimal.
SCP self-control training with this patient was instituted to be used for communication, which may require from 50-70 to several hundred training sessions (Birbaumer et al., 1999) as compared with 35 sessions in epilepsy patients. In Experiment I, an effect of self-control practice was found, in that the successful SCP self-control seems to precede SCP estimation. If this effect is consistent, and the peripheral hypothesis delineated above is wrong, SCP estimation in Experiment II may be expected to be better than in Experiment I. To the contrary, if this peripheral hypothesis is correct, the results of Experiment II should be worse or even remain at the chance level.
EXPERIMENT II

Materials and Methods
Patient JG, male, 33, had been suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) for 5 years. He had been artificially ventilated and fed for the past 10 months. He was still able to perform vertical eye movements. Using an artificial larynx cannula, he could pronounce one monosyllable word during exhalation. Like epilepsy patients, JG was not selected for this study due to his particularly good SCP control. Rather, he was investigated because he was almost completely paralyzed but still able to express verbally.
The purpose of using SCP control for communication enforced some methodological modifications in comparison with Experiment I. So the trial duration was shortened to 2.5 s, and the intertrial interval, which was variable in Experiment I, was fixed at 2 s. The patient was trained 3 days a week, and each training day contained 10 sessions with 5-to 7-min breaks between them. Regular training sessions consisted of 100 trials and contained no transfer trials. The self-perception procedure was introduced after 8 training days (that is, after 80 regular sessions) and carried out on 13 consecutive days, once a day (the remaining 9 sessions on those days were regular training sessions). These self-estimation sessions entailed 40 feedback trials and 20 transfer trials. Each transfer trial was preceded by two feedback trials and followed by a pause. During the pauses the patient spoke a number between 1 and 7 according to the estimated quality of the preceding trial.
JG used the entire range of 1 to 7, and his estimation scores were normally distributed. Therefore, the statistical analysis was conducted by means of a Pearson product-moment correlation between the actual amplitude of the SCP shift (in microvolts) and its estimate in each of the 13 self-estimation sessions. 
Results
Although the overall level of SCP control in JG was higher than in any of the epilepsy patients, this level was also lower in sessions with self-estimation (in which he attained a between-condition difference of 7.37 Ϯ 0.43 µV) than in regular training sessions which immediately preceded self-estimation sessions (11.82 Ϯ 0.59 µV). As shown in Fig. 4 , all except the very first correlation coefficient between the real and the estimated SCP amplitude were positive, with 6 of 13 coefficients being highly significant (r Ͼ .55, p Ͻ .01). For comparison, the highest correlation coefficient of the 66 obtained in Experiment I was .32. A regression analysis demonstrated that JG's ability to estimate his SCP shifts increased as a linear function of estimation experience (r ϭ .78, df ϭ 12, p Ͻ .002).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Large amount of data has been accumulated that animals (Pirch & Osterholm, 1974) , healthy people (Bauer & Lauber, 1979; Bauer et al., 1998; Birbaumer et al., 1981; Elbert et al., 1980; Kotchoubey et al., 1996a; Lutzenberger et al., 1993) , patients with epilepsy (Kotchoubey et al., 2001; Rockstroh et al., 1993) and motor paralysis (Kübler et al., 1998; Birbaumer et al., 1999) can learn to control their SCP changes. However, no data exist about the ability to perceive these changes or other electrophysiological processes in the brain. The only study directly addressing this issue yielded a negative result (Roberts et al., 1989) . The data of the present experiments indicate that patients with focal epilepsy as well as the ALS acquire the ability to correctly estimate their self-produced SCPs. Can this ability be interpreted as development of a new kind of perception, namely the perception of one's own brain states? An objection (often occurring when these data were presented), that ''real perception'' cannot be proven by ''merely reporting,'' should be rejected from the very beginning. There is no objective indicator of perception but one's ability (1) to correctly report on the perceiving object and (2) to manipulate with that object. Both conditions are fulfilled by those subjects who are able to control their SCPs and to estimate them. The requirement of proving the perception as a subjective state would go beyond the empirical science.
This does not mean, however, that a simpler explanation should not be preferred as soon as such an explanation is in accord with the data. The fact that ''good performers,'' that is, subjects who were more successful in the self-regulation of the SCPs, were also superior in estimation, indicates that estimation and control are related in some way. Earlier theories of biofeedback control (e.g., Brener, 1974) suggested that the ability to perceive is a necessary prerequisite to acquire control. This is in line with various general models that postulate that perception plays a critical role in subserving actions (for a critical review, see Michaels, 2000) . However, this view is at odds with the finding that epilepsy patients were able to control their SCP shifts considerably before they acquired the ability to estimate these shifts. Likewise, patient JG failed to estimate his SCP shifts in his first self-estimation session, although at that moment he was already able to control these shifts with an accuracy above 90%. The fact that, in the following sessions, this patient achieved much higher accuracy in estimation of his SCPs than any of the patients participating in the first experiment agrees with JG's more extensive practice and higher achievement in SCP control.
Thus, the ability to estimate the SCPs seems to develop on the basis of the efficient control rather than vice versa. This condition may have deep implications for the study of consciousness. It may mean that, when people start to operate with a completely new object (in this case, their own brain waves), the process of behavioral control, which is largely or even completely unconscious, emerges as first, whereas conscious perception follows it at relatively late stages.
This interpretation is in line with the model of Hommel (1993 Hommel ( , 1996 , who, on the basis of his experiments with stimulus-response incompatibility paradigms, came to the conclusion that actions are represented by codes of their perceived effects. From this point of view, patients are assumed to first learn to achieve action effects (i.e., to control the brain activity) and then to perceive these effects. But the question remains, what such perceived effects may be?
An obvious candidate on this role are peripheral (i.e., muscular) correlates of the brain activity reflected in SCP shifts, which might be perceived by means of proprioceptive afferentation. However, in the case of JG mediation of brain perception by means of the reafferentation from muscular receptors was almost impossible; nevertheless, the patient was able to estimate his SCP shifts with a very high precision (Fig. 4) . This fact is in line with what else is known about the insignificance of muscular mediation of SCP shifts. Patients with locked-in syndrome following brain stem stroke (Kübler et al., 1998) or ALS (Birbaumer et al., 1999) were able to control their SCPs with an accuracy between 80 and 90%. In healthy subjects, successful SCP control correlated with a reduction, rather than an increase, in activity of arm and face muscles (Elbert et al., 1980) . Furthermore, explicit instruction to tense muscles during negativity trials and reduce muscular tension during positivity trials did not improve SCP self-regulation performance (Birbaumer et al., 1988) . Of course, one would never be able to completely rule out the peripheral explanation as long as at least some muscles (for instance, muscles of eyes and larynx in JG) are still working, but systematical observations of patients like JG make this explanation implausible.
A peripheral interpretation of brain self-perception based on the neuromuscular mediation being unlikely, the question remains what physiological mechanisms are responsible for the learned perception of cortical changes. Preliminary fMRI findings indicate an increase in blood flow primarily in the prefrontal cortex during successful SCP self-control, with different areas being activated during positive versus negative SCP shifts (Bauer et al., 1998) . Although very speculative, the hypothesis cannot be ruled out that these differential changes in cortical circulation are perceived through the extension of receptors in the arterial walls.
A different stance is related to the assumption that the strategies to achieve the effect rather than the effect itself are perceived. Opposite to the previous point of view, it is not the consequences of the controlling actions, but these actions themselves, which subjects learn to correctly report. In line with this account, a very simple interpretation of our data would state that patients were just monitoring their vigilance level and considered an SCP shift as ''good'' when they believed they had been attentive enough or as ''poor'' when their alertness in the preceding trial had been low. The correlation with performance might, then, be explained by automatization of self-control in good performers; this automatization would free resources for vigilance monitoring.
Unfortunately, this simple explanation also fails to agree with the data. Such unspecific fluctuations of vigilance level may be expected to manifest themselves in other EEG parameters besides the SCPs. Specifically, the N1 component of the visual evoked potential is known to habituate being related to the level of arousal (Megela & Teyler, 1979; Kenemans et al., 1989) ; processes of attentional mobilization of resources are further manifested in the components P2 (Michie et al., 1993) and N2 (Näätänen & Picton, 1986; Kotchoubey et al., 1997) . Further, the fluctuations of the vigilance level in the course of the SCP biofeedback are consistently related to changes in EEG spectral characteristics (Kotchoubey et al., 1999b ; see also Sterman, 1996 , for the theoretical background). Phasic vigilance increment could be expected to result in a decrease of the alpha power (Oken & Salinsky, 1992; Newman, 1995) and an increase in the beta and, probably, theta frequency ranges (Klimesch, 1999; Laukka et al., 1995) . None of these predictions was supported: Neither evoked potentials nor spectral data demonstrated any variation as a function of the subjective estimation.
Therefore, the explanation which seems most plausible at present is that if patients actually estimated their control strategies, these strategies must have been specifically related to the controlling parameter (i.e., the SCPs) rather than to some general states.
This idea of perception as a function of control is well known in the general control theory. Hershberger (1998) writes, for instance:
. . . when one is watching an aircraft fly overhead . . . neither the visual direction of the aircraft, nor the aircraft's motion is represented on the retina. Rather, they are represented in extraretinal, oculomotor signals corresponding to the various orientations and movements of the eyes . . . The position of the image on the retina is relatively fixed, and simply reflects the intent to watch the object. That is, the reference values for the retinal slip and the retinal eccentricity are both set to zero, a priori. The motion of the aircraft . . . is registered in the nervous system a posteriori in terms of the oculomotor efference required to keep the aircraft's image on the fovea. (p. 14)
Similarly, our patients (good performers, at least) were able to control (i.e., to keep constant) the result of their activity by moving the cursor on the screen in the required direction, like the aircraft's observer keeps its retinal image on the fovea. In order to achieve this, the patients applied individually variable cognitive strategies. Although we, like Roberts et al. (1989) , found no consistency of cognitive strategies across subjects, some patients reported very consistent within-subject strategies based on differential imagery. These strategies were always different for required cortical positivity versus negativity. From this point of view, what is perceived are operations used for control. This would imply that physiological information may be perceivable when it becomes meaningful; for example, when it receives signaling function through an operant learning process.
Again, two possibilities remain open at this point. The patients may have estimated the controlling operations as such and cannot yet separate these operations from the brain states achieved by means of them. But it might be that these operations, recorded by a supervising ''executive system'' (Smith & Jonides, 1999) , were consolidated in form of firm percepts. At present we cannot distinguish between these two options. A crucial experiment would be a recording of actual and estimated SCP shifts in a condition different from that of SCP control. This may be, for instance, a condition of waiting for a relevant imperative stimulus in a signaled reaction time task or the situation in which a signal is expected to inform subjects whether the response they have just made was correct. If the acquired ability to correct selfestimation of SCP shifts can be transferred into a situation where these shifts are not directly produced, it is possible that the patients' putative strategies, reinforced over the course of training, finally led to two identifiable states of cortical negativity versus cortical positivity, whose clarity or intensity is then judged. Such an experiment has not been conducted yet. The main difficulty (mentioned above) is that the active task involvement necessary to obtain SCP changes would interfere with the second task of estimation of these changes. What is needed is a technique that allows participants to estimate their brain phenomena in a completely automatic manner in order for the dual-task interference to not distort the behavioral reality.
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